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Abstract
We build a simple model of secession crises where a majority of voters may wish to
accommodate a minority in order to prevent a secession attempt. We rst show the
existence of a majority voting equilibrium, where the median voter is decisive and
most prefers a governments type that is biased in favor of the minority. We propose
a measure of the secession risk at equilibrium, which depends upon the comparison
of the willingness to secede by the minority and to accommodate by the majority.
We show that focusing only on the willingness to secede, as previous literature has
done, is misleading when studying the impact on the risk of secession of the size
of the minority region, the probability that a secession attempt by the minority is
successful, and the cultural heterogeneity in the country.
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1 Introduction
Country boundaries have been in ux for a long time. For instance, the number
of internationally recognized countries has grown from 74 in 1945 to 193 in 2007
(Spolaore, 2008). Some of these new countries have been born following a peaceful
separation from larger blocks: this has been the case recently with the breaking-up
of the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovakia, or with the separation of Slovenia from
Yugoslavia. In many other cases, secession attempts have been less than peaceful,
with sometimes bloody secession crises, such as with Bosnia, Chechnya, Croatia,
Eritrea, Kosovo, South Sudan or Timor Leste. Other, less recent violent secession
episodes include Ireland, Bangladesh, Pakistan and India, etc. There are also many
countries where secession, although not (yet) attempted, is at least talked about.
Prominent examples include Belgium, Spain, Canada, etc. Gurr (2000) states that,
between 1985 and 1999, secessionist movements were present in at least 52 countries.
From this panorama, we gather that there are three main ways a country subject
to internal secessionist tensions may respond. One possibility is for the majority1 to
try to accommodate and placate the minority in order to prevent it from attempting
to secede. This is the route taken for now by Spain and Canada with, respectively,
Catalonia and Quebec, for instance. If accommodation is not attempted or fails to
assuage the disgruntled minority, secession attempts may be either fought by the
majority (resulting in a violent secession crisis) or accepted, leading to a peaceful
separation. The objective of this paper is to understand what determines which of
these three outcomes emerges in countries experiencing secessionist tensions.
The economic literature has focused on the incentives to secede by a minority
inside a country  i.e., Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Goyal and Staal (2004), Le
Breton and Weber (2003, 2004), Haimanko et al. (2005, 2007), and Drèze et al.
(2007), to name a few. Many contributions have adopted a cost-benet approach:
factors that make secession more protable to the minority (self-determination or
government closer to the people,support of neighboring state, ...) should increase
the risk of secession, while factors that make secession more costly to the minority
(economic losses, security, international hostility, ...) should reduce it.
These contributions (which we dub CCB, for classical cost-benet approach) ab-
stract from decisions by the majority either to preempt secession by accommodating
the minority, or to either ght or accept secession once it is attempted. In order
to incorporate those decisions, we build on Alesina and Spolaore (1997). Their
model appears to be particularly well suited to our purpose, for it nicely captures
the trade-o¤ between the cultural benets and the economic costs of secession. We
adapt this model in order to study how the majority takes these secession incentives
1From now on, we assume, in line with most of the empirical evidence (see Lustick et al., 2004),
that the group tempted by secession forms a minority of the country.
1
into account when deciding whether to prevent, accept or ght a secession attempt
by the minority.
In this paper, citizens belong to one of two regions of di¤erent sizes. They
di¤er according to their most-preferred type of a public good associated with the
functioning of a country, with individualsutility decreasing in the distance between
most-preferred and majority chosen type of public good. The distributions of most-
favoured types di¤er from one region to the other, and may be overlapping. By
seceding, a region can ensure that the type of the public good better ts its members
tastes: ideological considerations favour secession. On the other hand, economic
factors run against secession, because of returns to scale in the provision of the
public good provided by the government. The trade-o¤ between these two forces
determines both how willing the minority region is to secede, and how willing the
majority region is to accommodate the other region to prevent it from seceding.
The sequence of decisions (all taken by majority voting) we consider runs as follows.
After a national vote on the public goods type is taken, the minority region decides
whether to secede or not. The majority region then chooses whether to ght this
secession attempt or not. In the latter case, secession occurs peacefully while, in the
former case, a costly secession crises occurs, whose outcome is either a successful
secession or the maintenance of the unied country. When secession happens, each
region forms a new country and decides independently about its public good type.2
We rst identify the condition under which the majority region ghts a secession
attempt rather than accepting a peaceful separation. We assume throughout the
paper that this condition is satised, in order to focus on the choice between accom-
modation and repression by the majority region. We then show that the agent with
the median national location is decisive when voting over the national governments
type, but that this individual may favor a governments type that is biased in the
direction preferred by the minority. More precisely, accommodation is represented
by a threshold of governments type, indicating how much the decisive national voter
is ready to depart from the median location in order to prevent the minority from se-
ceding. Similarly, the willingness to secede is given by another threshold, indicating
what it the worst type that the minority is ready to accept rather than attempting
secession. The comparison between these two thresholds determines both whether
accommodation by the majority prevents a secession attempt by the minority, and
what policy is implemented when accommodation occurs at equilibrium.
We then study how the equilibrium risk of secession is a¤ected by changes in the
2The most closely related article is Spolaore (2008): we have in common that we model a
two-region setting where the decisions by the minority to secede and by the majority to ght
or not secession are driven by the same trade-o¤ between returns to scale and heterogeneity of
preferences. However, Spolaore (2008) focuses on the cost of conict and does not allow the
majority to accommodate the minority, but only to ght more or less intensively its secession
attempt.
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parameters of the model.3 The message of the paper is that, by focusing exclusively
on the willingness to secede, the CCB approach misses part of the picture (namely,
the willingness by the majority to accommodate) and consequently may misidentify
how the equilibrium risk of secession changes. We identify three areas where our
model generates predictions di¤erent from the CCB approach: they concern the im-
pact on the risk of secession of the size of the minority region, the probability that
a secession attempt by the minority is successful, and the cultural heterogeneity in
the country. The CCB approach predicts that the risk of secession increases with
both the size of the minority and the probability that a secession attempt succeeds
because they both increase the willingness to secede by the minority. We show that
they also increase simultaneously the willingness to accommodate by the majority,
resulting in an ambiguous impact on the secession risk (measured as an increasing
function of the di¤erence between the willingness to secede and to accommodate).
We also show in the nal section that the empirical literature seems more in line
with our prediction than with the CCBs one. As for the impact of cultural het-
erogeneity, we highlight the importance of distinguishing inter- from intra-regional
heterogeneity. For the former, we show that, although more heterogeneity has an
ambiguous impact on the willingness to secede, it nevertheless always increases the
secession risk. As for the latter, we obtain the opposite conclusion to the one drawn
by the CCB approach: while intra-regional heterogeneity in the main region (resp.,
the minority region) always increases (resp., decreases) the willingness to secede of
the minority, it decreases (resp., increases) the equilibrium secession risk because it
increases (resp., decreases) even more the willingness to accommodate of the ma-
jority. Unfortunately, it proves di¢ cult to test our predictions empirically, because
the empirical literature has failed to distinguish intra- from inter-regional cultural
heterogeneity. We then call for more applied research on this topic.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of voting under
the risk of secession, and discusses our key assumptions. Section 3 solves the model
while section 4 performs the comparative statics analysis of the equilibrium policy
and risk of secession. Finally, section 5 concludes by confronting our results to the
existing empirical evidence.
2 A Simple Model of Secession Crises
We consider a country populated by a continuum of citizens of total mass one.
Citizens belong to one of two regions which we label A and B. Let 1    and
 stand for the proportion of the country population residing in region A and B,
3To this end, we restrict the (overlapping or not) regional distributions of preferences to be
uniform.
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respectively. We assume w.l.o.g. that  < 1=2, so that region B is the minority
region.
A country needs a government, dened by Alesina and Spolaore (1997, p.1030)
as a bundle of administrative, judicial, economic services, and public policies,and
citizens di¤er in their preferences for the type of government provided. The set of
feasible governments types is represented by the interval [0; 1], and each citizens
location t on this interval represents her ideal governments type, with her utility
decreasing in the distance between ideal and chosen type.
In each region R 2 fA;Bg, citizenstypes are distributed over the interval [0; 1]
according to a c.d.f. Fa(tjR), where a 2 (a; a)  R++ is a parameter measuring
cultural distinctiveness between regions. The distribution of ideal policies in the
country is then given by
Fa;(t)  (1  )Fa(tjA) + Fa(tjB) .
Throughout the paper, we assume that:
(i) Fa(tjA)  Fa(tjB), for all t 2 [0; 1];
(ii) (Regional and national) median types are unique: there exist tA, tB, and tm in
[0; 1] such that
F 1a (f1=2gjR) =

tR
	
, 8R 2 fA;Bg , and F 1a; (f1=2g) = ftmg .
Furthermore, they satisfy tA < tm < tB and 2tm  tA + tB.
(iii) For all t 2 [0; 1], Fa(tjA) [resp. Fa(tjB)] is an increasing [resp. decreasing]
nonconstant function of a;
(iv) lima!a Fa(0jA) = 1  lima!a Fa(1jB) = 1.
Observe that we allow for the regional distributions of preferences to overlap,
while assuming that, whatever the governments type considered, the fraction of
people with preferences to the left of this location is at least as large in region
A than in region B (condition (i) above). Condition (ii) assumes that (regional
and national) median types are unique, and that the nationwide median voter, tm,
is closer to region As median voter, tA, than to his counterpart in region B, tB.
Finally, condition (iii) shows what we mean by cultural distinctiveness: increasing
a pushes the regional preference distributions apart, with the limit case in (iv) of
a totally polarized society. Observe that an individual of type tm always exists in
region A, and may exist in region B provided that the two regional distributions
overlap su¢ ciently.
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The nancial cost of implementing a government is independent of its type and
is given by g.4 Government is a pure public good, so that g is independent of the
size of the jurisdiction. We further assume that this cost is equally shared among
all citizens under the governments jurisdiction. The preferences of an individual
located at t are given by
c  jx  tj ;
where x denotes the type of government and c the agents consumption. If the agent
lives in a unied country, his consumption level c = cu is given by
cu  y   g:
If secession occurs, his utility depends of the region R 2 fA;Bg he lives in, with
x = xR the type of public good provided in region R and the consumption levels
c = cSR given by
cSA  y 
g
1   and c
S
B  y 
g

:
We denote the economic loss for citizens in region R that occurs with secession as
cR  cu   csR > 0, for each R 2 fA;Bg.
Events unfold as follows:
Stage 1. Citizens in the whole country choose by majority voting the type of
the national government, x 2 [0; 1].
Stage 2. A vote is taking place among region Bs citizens to determine whether
they want to secede or not. If a majority of region Bs citizens favor secession,
then a secession attempt occurs. Otherwise, the country remains united with a
governments type of x, and the citizens receive their nal payo¤.
Stage 3. If a secession was attempted in Stage 2, region A chooses (through
majority voting) whether to ght to prevent the breaking up of the country or not.
Stage 4. If a majority of region As citizens vote to ght the secession attempt
by region B, this secession attempt is successful with probability  2 [0; 1] and
the citizens in both regions R incur a per capita monetary cost of conict R > 0;
0 < A  B, whether secession is successful or not.5 If a majority of region As
4We assume that this cost a proxy for the size of government is exogenous. See De Donder
et al. (2012) for the joint political determination of the size and type of government.
5This cost can be either a nancial cost incurred during the secession attempt or its repression
(monetary value of assets destroyed, opportunity cost of resources invested,...) or a monetary
measure of the intrinsic readiness of the region to either secede (for B) or repress secesssion (for
A), like the ability to bear social unrest linked to demonstrations, civil war, or the heightened hate
from members of the other group. The assumption that the per capita cost is larger for the citizens
residing in the seceding region is very reasonable, if only because most if not all secession conicts
occur in the seceding region, where most of the physical damage takes place.
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citizens prefer not to resist, separation occurs with probability one without any
conict cost.
If the secession attempt is successful (irrespective of the decision by region A
to resist the attempt or not), a vote takes place in each region to determine the
governments type in this region. If the secession attempt has been successfully
repressed, the country remains united and a new vote takes place to choose the
national governments type, but this time with no ensuing threat of secession.6
Finally, we will make use of the following tie-breaking assumption: Each citizen,
when indi¤erent between an alternative leading to continued unity and an alternative
leading to a secession crisis, always votes for the former in a pairwise comparison.
We now solve this model for the equilibrium institutional arrangement (unied
country or secession) and policies.
3 Equilibrium Policy and Risk of Secession
As is usual, we solve the model backward, starting with the decisions taken in the
last stages. If the secession attempt is successful, a vote takes place in both regions
to determine the regional governments type. Preferences being single-peaked in x,
a Condorcet winner exists (i.e., an option that is favored by a majority of voters
to any other feasible option) and is given by the median most-preferred type in the
region, tR, R 2 fA;Bg. In the case secession is attempted but fails, the national
vote over the unique governments type results in the national median type, tm,
being selected as the unique Condorcet winner.
Moving up the sequence of events, we now study the voting decision in region A
whether to ght a secession threat by region B (stage 3). In the case where region A
does not ght, secession happens for sure and this regions equilibrium governments
type is tA. If region A chooses to ght, everyone in A supports a secession cost A
and faces a lottery between policy tA in a smaller country and policy tm in the
unied country. A citizen located at t in region A then prefers to repress a secession
attempt by region B if and only if


csA  
tA   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  A  csA   tA   t . (1)
This condition is independent of the value of x chosen in the rst stage, since this
policy is not on the table anymore once this decision node has been reached. For all
agents located between tA and tm, the incentive to oppose secession increases with
6This assumption is made to simplify the algebra. Our results hold through qualitatively
provided that the secession threat is less prevalent than at stage 1, so that region A citizens
are less willing to accommodate the preference of the minority region.
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the individuals location, as this moves the individual closer to the governments
type chosen nationally, tm, and away from the type chosen regionally, tA. The
incentive to oppose secession is minimum (and identical) for all agents located to
the left of tA, because the (negative) utility di¤erence between national and regional
governments type is minimum among region As inhabitants, and is the same for all
t  tA. Likewise, the incentive to oppose secession is maximum (and identical) for
all agents located to the right of tm, because the (positive) utility di¤erence between
national and regional governments type is maximum among region As inhabitants,
and is the same for all t  tm. This means that a majority of region As citizens vote
in favor of ghting region Bs secession attempt if and only if the median regional
type tA opposes secession, which is the case where
(F) A  (1  )
 
cA   (tm   tA)

.
Observe that, since all agents with t  tA have the same preference regarding the
attitude towards regionBs secession attempt, condition (F) actually ensures that all
agents in region A oppose the secession attempt by B. Region As citizens are more
likely to ght any attempt at secession by region B (meaning that assumption (F) is
easier to satisfy) if the cost of ghting, A, is low, if ghting has a high probability
to scuttle the secession attempt ( low), if secession means forgoing a large part of
the returns to scale associated with a single country (cA large, because g or  are
large) and if the regional median likes the national policy ((tm   tA) small).
As we are interested in the choice between accommodation of the minority pref-
erences (stage 1) and repression, cases in which the majority region is prepared to
repress secession attempts are our primary interest; so we assume in the remainder
of the paper that (F) holds.7 It is readily checked, however, that all our theoret-
ical results can be adapted to the case of peaceful secession by setting  = 1 and
A = B = 0 in what follows.
We then move backward to stage 2 and study the secession attempt decision
by region B. In case region B does not attempt to secede, a national government
of type x is implemented. If it attempts to secede, region Bs citizens anticipate
that region A will ght this attempt and that they will su¤er a secession cost B,
resulting in the following lottery: enjoying the returns to scale of a large country
with a governments type tm, or living in a smaller jurisdiction with a governments
type of tB. A citizen t in region B prefers her region attempting secession if and
only if


csB  
tB   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  B  cu   jx  tj .
7The case where (F) is not satised corresponds to peaceful secessions/separations, which seem
empirically to be much less prevalent than repressed secession attempts (Walter, 2009).
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Incentives to secede increase the closer a region Bs citizen is to tB and the further
away she is from x, and are then maximum for citizens t  tB.8 We then have that
a majority in region B favours secession if and only if
x  x    tB  cB+ (1  )tm   B < tB,
where the threshold x denotes the minimum value of the national governments type
such that a majority in region B does not attempt to secede (anticipating that region
A will ght this secession attempt). This threshold value of x is then a measure
of region Bs willingness to secede. Intuitively, this willingness (i) decreases with
the cost to attempt secession, B, (ii) increases when the median voter in region B,
tB, becomes more extreme or when the policy cost of a botched secession attempt
decreases because tm increases, and (iv) decreases when the loss of the returns to
scale associated with secession, cB, becomes larger.
We dene the secession set S as the set of policies such that region B attempts
to secede when x is chosen in the rst stage.9 Moving to the rst stage choice of x,
we assume that the secession threat by region B is binding  i.e., that the majority
chosen policy in the absence of a secession threat, tm, belongs to the secession set:
A1: tm 2 S (, tm < x).
If this assumption were not satised, the country would always remain united
with the governments type located at tm.
We can write the rst stage policy preferences of a citizen t living in region R as
follows
vR(x; t) 



csR  
tR   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  R if x 2 S ,
cu   jx  tj otherwise. (2)
Observe that vR(x; t) does not depend upon x provided that x 2 S, since in that
case the minority region attempts to secede so that the implemented policy is either
tR (if secession works out) or tm (if the attempt fails).
We prove the following lemma in the Appendix.
8We assume for the moment that x < tB i.e., that the national choice is never to the right of
region Bs median location. We come back to this assumption in the next footnote.
9Coming back to the previous footnote, there exists a value of x, which we denote by x^, such that
x > x^ > tB induces a majority of region B to secede. Formally, S  fx 2 [0; 1] : x < x or x > x^g.
This corresponds to the pathological case where the national policy x is so extreme that the least
extreme members of region B prefer to secede in order to implement the less extreme policy tB
rather than x. Allowing for this possibility does not change our results but treating it explicitly
would increase the length of the paper without adding any intuition, so we concentrate on the
cases where x < x^ in the remainder of the paper.
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Lemma 1. A Condorcet winner always exists when voting on x in stage 1.
(i) If vA (x; tm)  vA (x; tm) for all x 2 S, then x is the unique Condorcet winner;
(ii) otherwise, either the set of Condorcet winners coincides with S or x is the
unique Condorcet winner. In particular, there exists a0 2 [a; a] such that the set of
Condorcet winners coincides with S whenever a  a0.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is that a su¢ cient (although not neces-
sary) condition for the (national) median citizen tm in region A to be decisive (in the
sense that a majority-winning alternative must maximize her utility) is that cultural
distinctiveness is su¢ ciently large. Figure 1 depicts her preferences in two di¤erent
cases. The dotted line represents her utility as a function of x when the country
remains united (second line in (2)) while the horizontal line represents her utility
level when region B attempts to secede (the rst line in (2), which is independent of
x). The bold line represents her utility as a function of x when region Bs secession
decision is anticipated. The left panel corresponds to case (i) in the statement of
Lemma 1, and the right panel to case (ii).
[Insert Figure 1 around here]
In the rst case, x beats all alternatives outside of S (i.e., such that no secession
is attempted) with the support of citizens located to the left of x (who form a
majority thanks to A1), and beats all alternatives in S with the support of citizens
located to the right of the median tm. In the second case, any alternative in S beats
any alternative not in S with the support of region As citizens located to the left of
tm. Observe that this need not be the case for region Bs citizens of similar location
if the utility they obtain in S is lower than for a region As citizen of identical
location, which may be the case since region B is smaller than region A, and since
the secession crisis cost R is larger in region B than in A. We show in the proof of
Lemma 1 that a su¢ ciently large cultural distinctiveness between regions results in
a (national) majority of people, all located in region A, preferring any alternative in
S to any alternative not in S. Finally, if the regional preference distributions do not
overlap, than citizens of type tm are all located in region A, and are always decisive
when voting on x.
Observe that, if the national median voter in region A is not decisive, then
secession is never an equilibrium of this model. In order to focus on the interesting
and empirically relevant situations, we assume from now on that secession may
occur at equilibriumi.e., that type tm in region A is decisive when voting on x. As
explained above, a su¢ cient condition for this is that10
10Although it is possible to nd overlapping regional preference distributions such that type tm
in A is not decisive, these distributions (available upon request from the authors) actually look
very cooked up.
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A2: a  a0.
An immediate consequence of this lemma is that unity is maintained at equi-
librium (in which case x is enacted) if and only if tm prefers unity under x to a
secession crisis:
cu   jx  tmj   csA   tA   tm+ (1  )cu   A ,
or, equivalently,
x  y  cA + (1 + )tm   tA + A . (3)
The above expression captures nicely the two di¤erent sets of incentives in our
model: x summarizes the incentives to secede of the minority, while y measures
the willingness of the national decisive voter to accommodate region Bs preferences
(since y is the maximum value of x that this voter is willing to implement in order to
prevent region B from attempting secession). The equilibrium institutional arrange-
ment and governments type depend upon the comparison of these two thresholds,
as summarized by
Proposition 1. A secession attempt is avoided at equilibrium if and only if

 
tB  cB
  B    cA   tA+ 2tm + A . (4)
If this condition is satised, the implemented governments type is x for the whole
unied country. If it is not, secession is attempted by region B and the equilibrium
policy corresponds to tm for the whole country with probability 1  (failed attempt),
and to tR in region R with probability  (successful attempt).
We now turn to the comparative static analysis of the equilibrium.
4 Comparative Static Analysis of the Equilibrium
Proposition 1 describes the conditions under which no secession attempt is made,
because the decisive national median is ready to accommodate the minority while
simultaneously region B can be convinced not to secede. The ease with which
secession can be prevented can be represented by   y   x, which measures the
length of the range of policies that (i) do not induce region B to secede and (ii)
are preferred by the decisive national voter to the expected outcome in case of a
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secession attempt. We then assume that the equilibrium secession risk is decreasing
in .11
We perform the comparative static analysis of the secession risk at equilibrium,
with the objective of showing that focusing on the willingness to secede (as is done
by the CCB approach) may be misleading. We then study how this risk is a¤ected by
changes in the size of the minority region, the probability that a secession attempt
by the minority is successful, and the cultural heterogeneity in the country, since
those are the three areas where our predictions di¤er.12
One channel through which these variables inuence the risk of secession is the
modication of the identity of the national and regional median voters, tm, tA and
tB. In order to quantify these impacts, we need to resort to specic functional forms
for the distribution functions. We do this in a way that allows us to distinguish
explicitly the heterogeneity of preferences between and within regions.
We assume that Fa(jA) and Fa(jB) are of the form:
Fa(tjA) 
8<:
0 if t 2 [0; 1  a  A) ;
t+a+A 1
2A
if t 2 [1  a  A; 1  a+ A] ;
1 if t 2 (1  a+ A; 1] ,
Fa(tjB) 
8<:
0 if t 2 [0; a  B) ;
t a+B
2B
if t 2 [a  B; a+ B] ;
1 if t 2 (a+ B; 1] ,
where a > a = 1=2, and R  1  a, R 2 fA;Bg. In words, the regional preference
distributions are assumed to be uniform, with the distribution in region A (resp.,
B) distributed around 1  a (resp., a) with A (resp., B) measuring the dispersion
around the mean/median regional location (so that tA = 1 a and tB = a). Observe
that we allow the two distributions to overlap, which is the case if 1 a+A > a B
i.e., if the regional dispersions A and B are large enough and if the median
preferences in each region are close enough from each other. The nationwide median
voter is the value of tm that solves:
(1  ) tm+a+A 1
A
+  t
m a+B
B
 1 if 2a  
1 A + B + 1;
(1  ) tm+a+A 1
A
 1 otherwise.
11We can show (notes available upon request to the authors) that our setting in this paper is
formally equivalent (under certain conditions) to another where there is uncertainty as to the cost
of secession for region B, B , and where the equilibrium probability that this region attempts to
secede is an increasing function of .
12It is easy to see that a larger weight put on economic (as opposed to cultural) factors, as
measured by g, results in both a lower willingness to secede and a higher willingness to accommod-
ate, thereby decreasing the equilibrium risk of secession. In other terms, our model and the CCB
approach share the same predictions as to the impact of g.
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The rst line above corresponds to the case where tm belongs to the overlapping
regional preferences segment (it is easy to see that the condition under which it
happens is stronger than the condition for overlap stated above). It is readily checked
that tm 2 (1  a; a), so that
tm 
(
(1 )B+a[A (1 )B ]
A+(1 )B if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
1 (1 A)
1    a otherwise.
We start by analyzing the impact of the size of the minority, .
4.1 Relative size of the minority
Increasing the relative size of the minority region, , has three impacts: it moves
the identity of the national decisive voter to the right (i.e., closer to the median wish
in region B) while it decreases (resp., increases) the economic cost of secession for
region B (resp., A). We obtain that
dx
d
= (1 )dt
m
d
 dcB
d
=
(
g
2
  (1 )(1 2a)AB
[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1 ,
g
2
+ (1 )A
(1 )2 > 0 otherwise.,
so that region B becomes more willing to secede since a larger  decreases the
policy cost of a failed secession attempt (since tm increases with ) and decreases
the economic cost of a successful secession attempt as well. We also have that
dy
d
= (1+)
dtm
d
+
dcA
d
=
(
g
(1 )2   (1+)(1 2a)AB[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1 ,
g+(1+)A
(1 )2 > 0 otherwise.
Raising  increases the willingness of the national decisive voter to accommodate
region B, because of two e¤ects playing in the same direction: a larger  (i) increases
the value of the decisive voters type tm, moving her closer to region Bs preferences,
and (ii) increases the economic cost of secession for tm.
With both x and y increasing with , the net impact on  is a priori ambiguous.
Straightforward manipulations tell us that
d
d
= 

dcA
d
+
dcB
d
+ 2
dtm
d

=
8<:  
h
(1 2)g
2(1 )2 +
2(1 2a)AB
[A+(1 )B ]2
i
if 2a  
1 A + B + 1 ,

h
2A
(1 )2   (1 2)g2(1 )2
i
otherwise.
so that the equilibrium risk of secession increases if  is low enough and/or g is
large enough. When  is very small, the economic impact of secession on region
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Bs inhabitants decreases very fast with , which results in a lower  (and thus a
larger risk of secession). On the opposite, when  is large, the main driver is the
economic loss for region A in case of a successful secession attempt (since the cost of
government g is to be shared by a smaller proportion 1   of nationals), so that the
risk of secession decreases. A large enough value of g is a necessary condition for an
increase in the risk of secession (because it amplies the variations in the economic
costs of secession when  increases). We then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. As the relative size of the minority region, , increases:
(i) both the willingness to accommodate of the national median voter and the
willingness to secede of region B increase;
(ii) the equilibrium policy when no secession is attempted becomes more accom-
modating of the minority;
(iii) the risk of a secessionist conict at equilibrium increases if  is small and/or
g is large.
We now move to the impact of the probability that a secession attempt is suc-
cessful, .
4.2 Probability that a secession attempt is successful
Raising the probability that a secession attempt is successful intuitively results in
an increase in the willingness of region B to secede:
dx
d
= tB  cB   tm > 0
by assumption A1. In words, tB   tm represents the marginal policy gain for region
Bs decisive voter when a secession attempt becomes more successful, while cB
represents the marginal economic loss. The value of x increases with  if the marginal
gain is larger than the marginal loss, which is what assumption A1 implies.
Likewise, an increase in  induces the national median voter to be more willing
to accommodate region Bs preferences:
dy
d
= cA   tA + tm > 0:
The net impact on the risk of a secession attempt is then ambiguous:
d
d
= cA +cB  
 
tA + tB

+ 2tm
=
(
2+(1 )2
(1 ) g   (1 2a)[A (1 )B ]A+(1 )B if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
2+(1 )2
(1 ) g   2(1 )a+(1 2A) 11  otherwise.
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In countries where the weight attached to economic losses, g, is large, and cultural
distinctiveness, a, is low, raising the probability that a secession attempt is successful
tends to reduce the risk of a secession attempt. The e¤ect of the minoritys relative
size, , is ambiguous, for it has opposing e¤ects. First, it increases the median
voters type, tm, thereby reducing (resp. raising) the policy gain of secession (resp.
of maintained unity) for the minority (resp. the median voter). Second, a change
in  also a¤ects the marginal economic losses of both regions: positively for region
A, and negatively for region B.
We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. As the probability that a secession attempt is successful, , in-
creases:
(i) both the willingness to accommodate of the national median voter and the
willingness to secede of region B increase;
(ii) the equilibrium policy when no secession is attempted becomes more accom-
modating of the minority; and
(iii) the risk of a secessionist conict at equilibrium decreases if g is large and a
is low.
Taking into account both the willingness to accommodate and to secede does
not mean that the impact on the secession risk is always less clear-cut than when
focusing only on the willingness to secede, as we show in the next section where we
look at the cultural heterogeneity in the country.
4.3 Cultural distinctiveness
We rst consider the preference heterogeneity between regions, as measured by the
parameter a. It turns out that the impact of cultural distinctiveness occurs through
changes in the identity of the decisive voters: raising a unambiguously decreases tA
and increases tB. It also decreases tm, provided that
A < (1  )B: (5)
This condition is intuitive: a larger value of a decreases tm provided that there are
few people in region B ( small) and that the preferences of these individuals are
very thinly distributed around their median (B large). We assume from now on
that condition (5) is satised. Observe that it is always the case when the two
regional distributions do not overlap.
The impact of increasing cultural distinctiveness on the willingness of the minor-
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ity to secede, as measured by x, is given by
dx
da
= 
d
 
tB   tm
da
+
dtm
da
=
(
 + (1  )A (1 )B
A+(1 )B if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
2   1 otherwise. .
On the one hand, raising a increases the distance between tB and tm, which
makes secession more appealing to region B in case of a successful attempt. On the
other hand, it decreases tm, which makes secession less appealing in case the attempt
is thwarted. In other words, increasing a raises the stakes associated to a secession
attempt by region B. The sign of the net impact of a on x is then ambiguous and
depends upon the success probability : if it is low enough, the latter e¤ect is larger
than the former and region B becomes less willing to secede, driving a decrease in
x. Keeping in mind that x corresponds to the implemented policy in case secession
is prevented (i.e., when   0), we then obtain that more cultural distinctiveness
between regions may lead to either a decrease or an increase in the equilibrium
policy, depending upon the success probability .
The impact of a larger cultural distinctiveness on the willingness of the national
decisive voter to accommodate secessionist trends, as measured by y, is given by
dy
da
=
dtm
da
+ 
d
 
tm   tA
da
=
(
 + (1 + )A (1 )B
A+(1 )B if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
 1 otherwise.
Increasing a has two e¤ects of opposite signs on y: (i) the decrease in the identity
of the decisive voter, the country median tm, tends to decrease y; (ii) the increase in
the distance between tm and tA increases the decisive voters utility cost of secession
and thus the need to compromise to prevent secession, tending to increase y. Observe
that the second e¤ect is present only if preferences overlap signicantly (i.e., tm
belongs to the interval where preferences overlap), so that y decreases unambiguously
if preferences do not overlap. In case of overlapping preferences, the second e¤ect
is smaller than the rst one provided that  is small enough, in which case the
overall impact of a on y is negative: increased cultural distinctiveness unambiguously
reduces the incentives of the national decisive voter to accommodate region B and
prevent secession.
We now look at the total e¤ect of increasing a on the equilibrium risk of secession,
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as measured by :
d
da
= 
 
 d
 
tA + tB

da
+ 2
dtm
da
!
=
(
2 A (1 )B
A+(1 )B < 0 if 2a  1 A + B + 1 ,
 2 < 0 otherwise.
This net e¤ect is unambiguously negative, showing that, even though the impact on
both equilibrium policy when no secession is attempted and on regionBs willingness
to secede is ambiguous, increasing the cultural distinctiveness across regions results
in a larger risk of secession.
We summarize those results in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. A larger cultural distinctiveness between countries increases the
risk of a secessionist conict at equilibrium. The impact of cultural distinctiveness
on both the willingness to secede by region B and to accommodate by region A is
ambiguous, although it is negative in both cases provided that the probability of a
successful secession attempt, , is low enough.
We now move to the impact of the preference heterogeneity inside regions, start-
ing with Region A. The only impact of a larger heterogeneity in region A, A, is
to increase the identity of the national decisive voter, tm (this is intuitive, since a
larger heterogeneity increases the proportion of region As inhabitants with a most-
preferred type larger than any t > 1  a). This in turn increases the willingness of
region B to secede (since a failed secession attempt becomes less costly in policy
terms):
dx
dA
= (1  ) dt
m
dA
=
(
 (1  ) (1 2a)(1 )B
[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1
(1 )
1  > 0 otherwise,
while it also increases the willingness of the majority to accommodate (because the
decisive voter moves to the right):
dy
dA
= (1 + )
dtm
dA
=
(
 (1 + ) (1 2a)(1 )B
[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1
(1+)
1  > 0 otherwise.
We obtain that the impact on the willingness to accommodate is larger than on
the willingness to secede, so that the risk of a secession attempt decreases with
heterogeneity in region A:
d
dA
= 2
dtm
dA
=
(
 2 (1 2a)(1 )B
[A+(1 )B ]2 > 0 if 2a 

1 A + B + 1
2
1  > 0 otherwise.
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It is easy to see that we obtain the opposite impacts in region B.
We summarize those results in the next proposition.
Proposition 5. Increasing the heterogeneity of preferences inside region A (resp.,
B) results in an increase (resp., decrease) in both the willingness to secede by the
minority region and to accommodate by the majority, and in a smaller (resp., larger)
equilibrium risk of a secession attempt.
5 Empirical Discussion and Concluding Remarks
The framework developed here is a highly abstract model of secession crises. In our
view, it is also the simplest structure within which to analyze not only the decision
by a minority to secede (on which the existing literature has focused), but also the
decision by the majority whether to accommodate the minority in order to dissuade
secession, or to ght or accept a secession attempt by the minority.
While the CCB approach concentrates on the willingness to secede by the minor-
ity, we confront it to the willingness to accommodate by the majority to obtain the
secession risk at equilibrium. We have shown that our predictions di¤er in terms of
the impact on this secession risk of three sets of variables: the minority region size,
the exogenous probability that a secession attempt is successful, and the cultural
heterogeneity in the country.
The next step consists in confronting our predictions to data and empirical evid-
ence as to the factors which a¤ect the probability that a secessionist conict takes
place. On the impact of relative size, the CCB analysis obtains that a larger size
of the minority decreases its cost of secession and thus should result in a larger
secession probability. Our analysis shows that a larger minority size increases both
the willingness to accommodate and to secede, with an ambiguous impact on the
resulting secession probability. The empirical evidence on this matters seems more
in line with our prediction, with some papers nding a positive impact of relative
size (Fearon and Laitin (1999)) while others (Saideman and Ayres (2000) and Sorens
(2005)) nd no signicant e¤ect.
As for the impact of the (exogenous) probability that a secession attempt is
successful and using the CCB approach, a larger probability decreases the cost of
secession for the minority, resulting in a larger risk of secession at equilibrium. In our
model, a larger probability increases both the willingness to accommodate and to
secede, with an ambiguous net impact on the risk of secession. Now, it is di¢ cult to
nd a good proxy for this probability that a secession attempt is successful, but we
can nd in the empirical literature two elements that have a positive impact on this
probability: the support of neighboring states, and the existence of a large diaspora
from the same ethnic group as the minority tempted by secession. According to the
CCB approach, they should then increase the risk of secession. This is not what is
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observed in the data. As for the impact of a large diaspora, Boyle and Englebert
(2006) state that there is still little large-scale evidence of this link, for only Collier
and Hoe­ er (2002) have found a positive e¤ect of diasporas on separatism. Their
measurement, however, was limited to populations living in the United States, based
on the 2000 census, which is likely to be a biased estimate.As for the support of
a neighboring state, the empirical evidence suggests either no e¤ect (Fearon and
Laitin 1999) or a negative one (Sorens 2005).
One important characteristic of our modelling is that it disentangles the impact
of cultural diversity between regions from those stemming from the heterogeneity
in preferences inside regions. In both dimensions, our predictions di¤er from those
obtained with the CCB approach. A larger heterogeneity between regions has an
ambiguous impact on the willingness to secede, but results in an unambiguously lar-
ger equilibrium risk of secession once the willingness to accommodate is also taken
into account. As for the heterogeneity inside regions, the impact on the willingness
to secede (positive if region A becomes more diverse, negative if region B is more
heterogeneous) is swamped by the impact on the willingness to accommodate, so
that the risk of secession decreases (resp., decreases) if the majority (resp., minority)
region becomes more heterogenous. The empirical literature has tested the claim
that cultural pluralism within a country will increase the number of secessionist
claims. (Boyle and Englebert, 2006, p.7). Unfortunately, this literature has not
tried to disentangle the impacts of inter- and intra-regional cultural pluralism. In
the light of our model, it is then no surprise that the evidence is rather weak if
not contrarian, however. Hale (2000) and Sorens (2005) nd positive relationships
between ethnic/linguistic distinctiveness and separatist propensity. Yet, Treisman
(1997:231), Laitin (2001: 852) and Saideman and Ayres (2000) found no evidence
that ethnic antipathies or attachments to ethnic identities are important determ-
inants of separatism. Further, Fearon and Laitin (1999) and Collier and Hoe­ er
(2002) observed that social fractionalization actually reduced the likelihood of iden-
tity wars and rebellions  as it makes it less likely for a specic group to have a
distinct and su¢ ciently large regional(Boyle and Englebert, 2006, p.7).
Granted, this is at most tentative empirical evidence that our models predic-
tions, when they di¤er from those of the CCB approach, are more empirically relev-
ant. Or, in other words, that our model improves upon the CCB approach precisely
where the empirical evidence does not conform with their predictions. To go bey-
ond this rst impression, there is need not only for more empirical research on the
risk of secession, but more importantly on how much majorities accommodate their
unruly minorities, and of what determines whether a secession attempt is fought or
peacefully accepted by the majority.
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Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
(i) Suppose that vA (x; tm)  vA (x; tm) for all x 2 S. As the preferences of all
citizens are single-peaked on U  [0; 1] n S  with a peak at x  for all t  x
(with x > tm by A1), x is majority-preferred to any other government type x 2 U
(Median Voter Theorem). To establish the result, it su¢ ces to show that, for all
x 2 S, vA (x; tm)  vA (x; tm) implies vA (x; t)  vA (x; t) for all t > tm.
Consider rst a citizen t in region A. She prefers x to x 2 S if and only if
cu   jx  tj   csA   tA   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  A ,
or, if t tm, equivalently,
t  jx  tj    tA  cA+ (1  )tm   A .
Since the left-hand side of the above inequality is strictly increasing in t if t < x
and constant in t if t  x, all citizens t > tm in region A strictly prefer x to x 2 S
whenever tm weakly prefers x to x.
By construction of x, citizens t  tB in region B are indi¤erent between x and
x 2 S (and therefore vote for x). Citizens t  tB in region B weakly prefer x to
x 2 S if and only if
cu   jx  tj   csB   tB   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  B , (6)
where the relationship holds with equality for t = tB by denition of x. The deriv-
ative of the left hand side with respect to t is strictly lower than the derivative of
the right hand side when x  t < tB, proving that these individuals in region B
strictly prefer x to 2 S. Finally, consider citizens t < x in region B. Condition (6)
can be rewritten as
t   tB +cB  (1  )tm   x+ 2(1  )t+ B  0 .
Moreover vA (x; tm)  vA (x; tm) implies
m  (1 + )tm     tA  cA  x+ A  0 .
To complete case (i), it thus su¢ ces to check that t  m for all t 2 (tm; x):
t   m = 2(1  )t+   tA + tB  2tm +  (cB  cA) + B   A
> 2(1  ) (t  tm) > 0 .
(The rst inequality comes from the fact that tm is closer to tA than to tB.)
(ii) Suppose now that vA (x; tm) < vA (x; tm) for some (and therefore all) x 2 S.
We rst establish that the set of Condorcet winners is either S or fxg (and is
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consequently nonempty). If the set of Condorcet winners does not coincide with S,
then there must exist a government type x 2 U that beats all the elements of S in
a pairwise majority vote (recall that citizens who are indi¤erent between separation
and unity with government type x are assumed to vote for x). We now claim that
this implies that x beats all the elements of S in a pairwise majority vote.
If x = x, the claim is trivial; so suppose that x 6= x. We want to prove that
citizens who prefer x to secession (i.e., to any element of S) must also prefer x to
secession. This is obvious for citizens t  x in region A and citizens t  tB in region
B, for they always prefer x to secession. All citizens t  (x+ x) =2 (in both regions)
prefer x to x. As a consequence, they prefer x to secession S whenever they prefer
x to the elements of S. Finally, consider a citizen t 2  (x+ x) =2; tB in region B:
As tm < x < t < tB,
cu   t+ x  cu   t+   tB  cB+ (1  )tm   B
= 
 
csB   tB + t

+ (1  ) (cu   t+ tm)  B + 2
 
tB   t
> 
 
csB   tB + t

+ (1  ) (cu   t+ tm)  B
which implies that she prefers x to secession. This proves that all members of
the majority preferring x to secession also prefer x to secession. As x is majority-
preferred to all y > x, it must be the unique Condorcet winner. This proves that
the set of Condorcet winners is either S or fxg.
We now establish that there exists a0 2 (a; a) such that the set of Condorcet
winners coincides with S whenever a  a0. To do so, we rst show that, for any
x 2 S and any x0 2 U , vA (x; tm) > vA (x0; tm) if and only if vA (x; t) > vA (x0; t) for
all t  tm in region A. Consider a region A citizen with t < tm: she (strictly) prefers
x to x0 if and only if
cu   jx0   tj <  csA   tA   t+ (1  ) [cu   jtm   tj]  A ,
or, equivalently,


t+
tA   t < x0   cA   (1  )tm   A .
As the left-hand side of the above inequality is weakly increasing on [0; tm], this
proves that all citizens t  tm in region A strictly prefer x to x0. As vA(x; t)  
vA(x
0; t) is continuous in t, there exists  > 0 such that all region As inhabitants in
[tm; tm + ) also prefer x to x0. As Fa (tm + jA) is increasing in a and
(1  ) lim
a!a
Fa (t
m + jA)  (1  ) lim
a!a
Fa (0jA) = 1   > 1
2
,
there must exist a0 2 (a; a) such that the set of region As citizens in [0; tm + )
constitutes a majority of the population. This proves that any x 2 S beats any
x0 2 U , thus completing the proof of the lemma.
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Figure 1: Policy preferences of the median citizen living in region A.
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